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FORUM
Widener referred to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 97: "... the whole question is not whether
the testimony is truthful; rather, the issue is whether there has
been such "adequate 'confrontation' "as to satisfy the require-
ments of the Constitution's Sixth Amendment. 574 F.2d at
1139.
In stating his belief that the admission of Brown's grand jury
testimony violated the right of the defendants to confront him,
forcing a reversal of the trial court convictions and remanding
the case for new trial, Judge Widener reiterated that "the
confrontation clause invokes a means of trial procedure which
provides a minimal, or threshold level of protection to the
defendant."
Citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), Judge Widener
stated: ". . .the essence of the confrontation clause is the
judgment that, the defendant is entitled, at the very least, to the
presence of the accuser before him and the jury." 574 F.2d at
1140.
As the dissent of Judge Widener concludes, this writer
believes that the issue of the inclusion at trial of grand jury testi-
mony of an unavailable witness, testimony controlled by the
prosecutor's leading questions and not subject to cross-
examination, is one that the Supreme Court must address. In
West, the majority may have extended the residual hearsay
exception under §804 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
a point that infringed on the basic procedural right of




Products liability actions typically involve complaints against
parties who distribute products that cause physical injury to
persons or property. These suits are generally based upon
theories of negligence, breach ot warranty, and strict liability in
tort,' with the latter cause of action at the vanguard of recent
developments in "actionable products" litigation.
Two issues of particular concern to the products liability
attorney are the concepts of defect and contributory
negligence in a strict liability action.2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court recently addressed these points in Cepeda u.
Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816
(1978), a decision which offers a viable solution to the problems
of setting the standard for defining the defectiveness of a
product, but continues the controversy over the degree
and kind of contributory negligence on the part of the
injured plaintiff which will bar his recovery.
1. One commentator has stated that there are "at least nine distinct legal theories
on which a plaintiff may rely." Tort theories are: negligence, negligent misrepre
sentation threatening physical harm, strict liability for defective product, and
strict liability for innocent misrepresentation; Contract theories. breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, and breach of express warranty; Also, "two hybrid theories
that may involve a breach of some 'extra-U.C.C.' implied or express warranty."
Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis of its Vitality, 29 MERCER L. REV.
583, 584-585 (1978).
2. See, Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning ofDefect, 5 ST. MARYSL. J.
30 (1973).
The doctrine of strict liability in tort is expressed in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) as follows:
Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for
Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The Rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the pre-
paration and sale of its product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller.
It is immediately apparent that in a strict liability action one
neither needs to prove negligence on the part of the seller, nor
establish privity as a requirement to sue. The inquiry in the
strict liability suit is directed towards the product; such liability
is strict in that the seller's compliance with a negligence stan-
dard of care is irrelevant. Moreover, inasmuch as the require-
ment of privity is abolished, the intricacies of the law of
commercial transactions3 no longer must receive the at-
tention of the jury; again, the proper focus is shifted to
the product, and thus a workable definition of what
constitutes defectiveness under the Restatements formula
assumes great importance.
There are three modes of defectiveness precedent to finding
that a product is actionable:4 defects from design, a manufac-
turing error, and defects from a failure to affix to hazardous
products warnings and instructions necessary to ensure their
safe and proper use.5 Because strict liability does not mean
absolute liability, the plaintiff must prove that there was a de-
fect in the product at the time it left the defendant's con-
trol. See, Note, 17 FORDHAM L. REV, 943, 944 (1974). This
need for a standard of defectiveness is particularly important
because a juror may intuitively find a product to be defective
simply because the plaintiff was injured while using the pro-
duct-the juror would believe that the presence of injury
means that something was "wrong" with the product. This is
clearly absolute liability. As Dean Wade has stated: "Strict lia-
bility for products is clearly not that of an insurer. If it were, the
plaintiff would need only to prove that the product was a fac-
tual cause in producing his injury. Thus, the manufacturer of a
match would be liable for anything burned..." Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825,
828 (1973); see also, Note, supra, 17 FORDHAM L. REV. 943,
944-946.
3. For example, the seller may exclude warranties under U.C.C. §2 316
(although such disclaimer is unconscionable in personal injury cases). But see,
MD. COMMERCIAL LAW CODE §2-316.1. A statute of limitations may defeat even
a timely products liability complaint where it runs from the date of sale, and the
injury may not occur until after the sales transaction. Further, the plaintiff's action
may fail due to lack of privity, although some versions of U.C.C. §2 318 allow for
actions by third party beneficiaries not in privity to the sale.
4. Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturer's Liabilityfor Products, 10 INDIANA L.
REV. 755, 756 (1977). The term "actionable" is Wade's-it signifies a product's state
or characteristic which would support a cause of action.
5. A treatment of this third aspect is beyond the inquiry of this article.
The language of the Restatement does not end with the term
"defect," however, but further qualifies it with the phrase "un-
reasonably dangerous." This additional language was deemed
necessary to give substance and clarity to the concept of defect
in actions involving product design. The manufacturing defect
needs no explanation; the product was unsuccessfully made
and it is judged, in effect, against those properly completed on
the same assembly line. The design defect, on the other hand, is
more abstract. A design defect appears in a product that is
manufactured as intended, but which falls below societal ex-
pectations of reasonable safety. The Restatement articulates
the rationale for the qualifying language as follows in
commentary to section 402A:
comment i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this
section applies only where the defective condition of the pro-
duct makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entire-
ly safe for all consumption.. The article sold must be danger-
ous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by an ordinary consumer. . .with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics...
The standard contemplated by the Restatement, then, is the
community expectation of safety in that product design. This
qualification to what constitutes defectiveness also reflects the
concern that some useful products are dangerous if overused
or abused; absolute liability might be imposed although the
manufacturer has a "good" design which necessarily entails
some risk in use. For example, gasoline is very dangerous when
used to clean auto parts in a closed shop. Its volatility, however,
makes it desirable as a fuel; it would be unreasonably danger-
ous if it exploded every time a fuel tank was being filled.
The Restatement's required element of "unreasonable
danger" has received some criticism. The consumer may not
possess the expertise to develop a reasonable expectation as
to the safety of a particularly complex product; the product
may be held in low esteem by consumers in a particular area,
thus lowering the threshhold of safety a product must reach
for it to win the jury's approval. See P. Keeton, Product Liabili-
ty and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37 (1973).
Dean Wade notes that "unreasonable danger" might be taken
either as a completely separate element the plaintiff must
prove, or as a redundant term, or perhaps as a suggestion that
the product be "superhazardous." Wade, ante, 44 MISS.L.J. at
830-833.
The "unreasonable danger" standard was criticized and re-
jected in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). Cronin exemplifies he
Greenman [v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)] rule which posits liability
where a product is merely defective and causes personal injury.
See Wade, ante, 44 MISS.L.J. at 829. Intending to simplify jury
instructions, the court in Cronin also strove to prevent a revival
of a negligence cause of action and its attendant high burden of
proof which it stated would be a retreat from the social policy
behind the adoption of strict liability.
Stating at 8 Cal.3d 133, 501 P.2d 1162, 104 Cal. Reptr.
442 that
a bifurcated standard requiring a showing of defect and un-
reasonable danger is of necessity more difficult to prove than
a unitary one. . .and proclaiming that the phrase "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous" requires only a single
finding would not purge that phrase of its negligence com-
plexion,
the court established what it thought was a "clear and simple
test for liability determination" as well as a departure from a
term which "rings of negligence." Id.
A number of courts have joined Cronin in excising the "un-
reasonable danger" criterion from strict liability in tort instruc-
tions. See, for example, Butaud v. Suburban Marine and
Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975), modified on
other grounds 555 P.2d 42 (1976). Berkebile v. Brantley Heli-
copter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975);6 Glass v. Ford
Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (L.Div. 1973). Of
these, Berkebile perhaps has the most cogent criticism of the
supposed superfluity of the unreasonable danger standard in
strict liability cases. Articulating the premise that proof of de-
fect is sufficient without qualification to establish liability, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated at 96, 337 A.2d 900:
We hold today that the "reasonable man" standard in any
form has no place in a strict liability case. The salutary pur-
pose of the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification is to
preclude the seller's liability where it cannot be said that [the
product was defective in manufacture]; [this purpose can be
fulfilled by requiring proof of defect or perhaps a design
source of the injury].
See generally, Note, 21 VILLANOVA L. REV. 802, 807 (1976).
Contra, Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Company, 402 F.Supp.
1268 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd 538 F.2d 318 (3rd Cir. 1976) (" [W]e
believe that the phrase 'defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to users' is a unitary concept and that the purpose of
the draftsmen would be frustrated by severing from it 'unrea-
sonably dangerous' without substituting another suitable
phrase which tends to clarify the meaning of defective
condition."); Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dan-
gerous"from §402A the Price of Consumer Safety, 14DUQ.
L. REV. 25 (1975).
Photo byJJ.R.
6. The precedential value of Berkebile is questionable as only two justices signed
the opinion, with the rest only concurring in the result.
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Cepeda u. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152,
386 A.2d 816 (1978), takes its place with this constellation of
authorities as a potentially formidable influence which may sub-
stantially affect the controversy over the interpretation of the
Restatement's language.
The product before the court in Cepeda was an industrial
pelletizing machine manufactured by the defendant. The
machine functioned to "draw strands of plastic.. into position
for cutting into very small pellets." Page 165 of 76 N.J., 386 A.2d
at 822. Prior to cutting, the strands were drawn past a horizon-
tal opening, through rollers and finally over a rotating drum e-
quipped with knives. Because of the danger to a person's hand,
the engine was designed to accommodate a guard which would
pass the plastic strands but was too small to allow introduction
of a worker's limbs. The court noted that the guard was often
removed for maintenance and cleaning and the machine
operated without it.
The guard was absent when Jose Francisco Cepeda arrived
for work one night in April, 1968. During the operation of the
pelletizer, his hand became caught in one of the plastic strands,
was drawn into the machine, and Cepeda was seriously injured.
Cepeda sued the manufacturer, basing his action on
negligence and breach of warranty causes of action, alleging
that the machine was defectively designed from a safety view-
point because it could be operated without the safety guard.
Plaintiff alleged that if the machine had been designed with an
interlock which frustrated operation without the guard, the
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After submitting the issue of strict liability in tort to the jury,
the trial court rendered a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Appellate Division reversed, 138 N.J.Super. 344, 351 A.2d
22 (1976), on the theory that the manufacturer was entitled to
expect normal use-i.e. operation with the guard in place. This
court in effect decided that the machine was not defectively
designed, because failure to operate the pelletizer with the
guard in place was not a contingency for which the product
needed to be designed.
In reversing, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that
the Appellate Division failed to "give the plaintiff the benefit of
all proofs and of all legitimate inferences therefrom favorable to
the plaintiff, before deciding the fact issues... against him. "76
N.J. 163, 386 A.2d 821. As to the issue of defectiveness, the
court stated that the evidence supported a reasonable infer,
ence that the defendant indeed could have foreseen misuse,
and given such foresight, it was incumbent upon the designer to
produce a machine in such a way as to counteract any
anticipated use or misuse.
7
In its opinion, the court expressed approval of a risk/utility
analysis 8 for the resolution of design defect cases. At page 163,
386 A.2d 821, the court stated:
Authoritative interpretation of section 402A... justifies our
adopting the rule that knowledge of the dangerous potential-
ity of a machine design as reflected by the evidence at trial is
imputable to the manufacturer, and that the remaining deter-
minative question as to affirmative liability is whether a rea-
sonably prudent manufacturer with such foreknowledge
would have put such a product into the stream of commerce
after considering the hazards as well as the utility of the ma-
chine.. .and such other factors as would bear upon the pru-
dence of a reasonable manufacturer in so deciding whether
to market the machine.
While this approach imparts a "ring of negligence" to a strict
liability action, requiring as it does a determination of the defen-
dant's "prudence" in marketing a dangerous product, the jury's
decision is based on an examination of the product. With the
7. To be inferred from the court's discussion of both foreseeability and risk/utility
is that a manufacturer should foresee the risks involved in "second collision" or
"enhanced injury" situations In these cases, while the defect does not cause the
accident, it may play a major role in aggrevating injuries after the original accident.
A good example is a case where a Ford Pinto, a notorious fire bomb, is "rear
ended" and bursts into flames. The design defect alleged is usually poor
placement of the fuel tank behind the rear axle, unsafe fuel filler design, and
protrusions from the rear bumper area which are aimed at the fuel tank in a
manner that allows them to puncture the cell and cause an explosion. These
defects do not cause collisions, but they do minimize the survival chances of the
car s passengers.
Many cases have held that the manufacturer should not be held liable in the
second collision situation. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1966), cert. den. 385 U.S. 836 (1966). The better reasoned cases,
however, recognize that it is reasonable to expect that a significant number of
products will be involved in accidents and that their design and manufacture
should account for this possibility. See, e.g., Larsern v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968);Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201,321
A.2d 737 (1974). Cf. Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 76 NJf t52,
386 A.2d 816 (1978) ("The fact that the instant machine was commercially
'reasonably fit for its intended purpose' of pelletizing plastic strands is obviously
irrelevant to the postulate of strict tort liability to a workman injured by reason of
the unsafety of the machine due to a design defect.").
8. See n. 7, supro. Obviously, "second collision" considerations are subject to a
balance of risk inherent in the design with its utility. A Sherman tank poses little
"second collision" danger, but is not too fuel-effective. In any event, a court would
follow a case by case approach: in some circumstances, it would be impossible to
design a "collision safe" automobile and still keep it as a useful vehicle.
element of scienter imputed to the defendant as a matter of law,
the plaintiff need not shoulder the burden of proof to
demonstrate it as a matter of fact. Wade, ante, 44 MISS. L.J. at
834-835. The qualities of the product itself allow an inference
that the defendant made an unreasonable marketing decision.
See Keeton, supra, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38. Moreover, the
court stated that the misuse of the product, if objectively fore-
seeable, presents no defense where the product is defectively
designed and marketed in a condition "not duly safe." See
Cepeda, ante at 177, 386 A.2d 828-829.
In adopting the risk/utility approach, the court retained the
"unreasonable danger" qualification in design defect cases
while deeming it an unnecessary element in those actions
involving alleged defects in manufacture. Page 170 of 76 N.J.,
386 A.2d 825. This holding effectively overrules Glass v. Ford
Motor Co., supra, which had eliminated the unreasonable
danger standard entirely.
After finding for the plaintiff as to the unreasonably danger-
ous nature of the product design, the court retreated from its
enlightened vision of the issues involved and relied upon the
assumption of risk issue as a reason to remand the case.
At the first trial, the defendant manufacturer had argued that
Cepeda was contributorily negligent in operating the machine
without the guard, and that this lapse on his part should be
interposed between the defendant's unreasonable decision to
market the machine and the plaintiff's injury. The trial court
presented this issue to the jury, instructing both as to careless-
ness and as to the assumption of risk aspect (the voluntary and
unreasonable encounter with the danger) of contributory
negligence.
The jury decided that Cepeda was contributorily negligent,
but that this "misbehavior" was not a substantial factor in
bringing about the accident. While the Appellate Division did
not reach this apparent inconsistency, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to consider the effect of plaintiff's conduct
on the issue of liability. Instructing the second trial court, on
remand, to limit the trial to the issue of voluntary unreasonable
exposure to danger, the court stated at 189, 386 A.2d 834:
Until such time as consideration is given in this State to ex-
tending the principle of comparative negligence or fault to
strict liability in tort... the continuance of unreasonable vol-
untary exposure of oneself to a known danger as a defense to
strict liability in tort seems a fair balance of justice and policy
in this area.
The opinion notes that because a finding of assumption of risk
necessarily entails a finding that plaintiff's conduct, not the pro-
duct, was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury the verdict of
the jury that Cepeda was contributorily negligent and not a
substantial factor in causing the accident was unsatisfactory.
See page 191 of 76 N.J., 386 A.2d 835. Three justices disagreed.
The dissenting justices read the evidence as incapable of es-
tablishing that Cepeda was either contributorily negligent or as
a factor in the chain of causation. Moreover, concerning the
assumption of risk issue as to the employment milieu, they
questioned its very applicability as a proper defense in this
case.
There is extensive commentary and authority which tends
either to reject the theory outright or closely circumscribes the
range of its vitality in industrial accident cases. See, e.g., Bexiga
v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1970); Rhoads v. Service Machine Co., 329 F.Supp. 367, 380
(E.D. Ark. 1971); A. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-
Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era,
60 IOWA L. REV. 1, 27 (1974); D. Noel Defective Products: Ab-
normal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of
Risk, 25 VAND. L.REV. 93, 126-127 (1972)("It would seem that
when a manufacturer supplies a dangerous machine for use by
employees, the workman injured because of the unsafe design
is subject to. . .economic pressure and that his consent... is
... not free and voluntary.").
At first glance the test for assumption of risk articulated by
the majority is fair and just because the reasonable plaintiff will
not fail to recover in spite of such a defense.9 The genesis of the
requirement that assumption of risk as a defense should be
based upon unreasonable exposure to the risk created by the
defendant is found in comment n to section 402A of the second
Restatement, which reads insofar as is pertinent:
n. Contributory negligence. . .Contributory negligence of
the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely of a failure to discover the defect in the product, or
to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other
hand the form of contributory negligence which consists of
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section... If the
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make
use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from
recovery.
The key word here is unreasonable. As stated by the court,
a reasonable voluntary exposure to a known hazard should not
excuse a defendant from liability for marketing an
unreasonably dangerous machine. 76 N.J. 189 n.9, 386 A.2d
834 n.9. The question becomes one of interpreting the plaintiff's
actions and his subjective state of mind. That the court was
divided as to the need for a new trial on this issue suggests that
some objective content needs to be imparted to the word "un-
reasonable" if consistency in these actions is to be maintained.
Moreover, a close adherence to a "comment n standard" can
lead to an unconscionable result.
The use of the assumption of risk defense often leads to an
unfair comparison of the respective choices of the parties. How
can the jury compare a hurried decision by an employee, which
might lead to injury, with the unreasonable marketing decision
of the defendant, carried out with substantial planning and
foresight? An example of this situation is Bartkewich v.
Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968), where an employee
reached into a machine to prevent it from jamming. With reflec-
tion it might seem that his action was unreasonable. Surely the
court thought so because it reversed a jury verdict for the plain-
tiff. However, the court ignored the exigency of a normal
factory situation, equating the decision by the plaintiff on the
job with the designer who, in a more relaxed atmosphere,
opted not to equip the device with a safety barrier or emer-
gency switches. In commenting on Bartkewich, Aaron Twerski
wrote:
There is something terribly distasteful about this result... Is
it not common knowledge that employees who work with
dangerous machinary develop psychological resistance to
the danger level? And shouldn't the safety features be
9. See 76 N.J. 152, 189 n.9, 386 A.2d 816, 834 n.9.
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embodied to care for one who may make voluntary and
unreasonable choices?.. Should not the product have been
manufactured so as to protect a Bartkewich-type plaintiff
from his own foolish decision making?
Twerski, ante, 60 IOWA L. REV. at 33. See also, for aparticu-
larly unfortunate decision, Patten v. Logeman Bros. Co., 263
Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971).
A number of commentators have questioned the role of
assumption of risk in the strict liability field, See, e.g., F. James,
Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L. J.
185 (1965); A. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restruc-
turing Assumption of Risk in the Product Liability Era, 60 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1974), and have reasoned that the courts should
examine the extent of the defendant's duty instead. That
courts have done this to some extent was shown in Cepeda,
where at page 177, 386 A.2d 828, the court noted that "many,
if not most jurisdictions now acknowledge that in applying strict
liability in tort for design defects manufacturers cannot escape
liability on grounds of misuse or abnormal use if the actual use
proximate to the injury was objectively foreseeable."
This is clearly a duty analysis, with the defendant's
responsibility coextensive with the ability of a reasonable
manufacturer to foresee possible harm to the consumer. There
is no reason to treat a plaintiff's risk-taking differently from his
misuse of the product if such misbehavior is arguably
foreseeable.10 It is not a "leap of faith" to realize that a designer
may also reasonably foresee that in a work environment an
employee may make a decision which at the time of trial may
appear to be unreasonable. Notwithstanding a plaintiff's error
in judgement, the product may be dangerous in design as was
the machine which injured Jose Cepeda. Under the assump-
tion of risk view, the New Jersey Supreme Court was contra-
dictory; on the one hand, it imposed a duty upon a manu-
facturer to protect consumers from anticipated misuse; on the
other it absolved the defendant from the very obligation it
assumed when it marketed a product which lent itself to the
very misuse which, when denominated as an "unreasonable
encounter with danger," is miraculously transformed into
assumption of risk. Cf. Micallef v. Miehle Co., Etc., 39 N.Y. 2d
376, 384, 348, N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 120 (1976);
Palmer v. Massey-Fergusan, 3 Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d
713, 719 (1970) ("The manufacturer of the obviously defective
product ought not to escape because the product was
obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to discourage
misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form.").
These cases typify those which attend the decline of the patent
danger rule" which has prevented recovery in the past because
the plaintiff had been deemed to be sufficiently "warned" by the
obviousness of the danger in the product. The irony of this view
is that the visibility of the peril increases the defendant's fore-
seeability of its potential for danger in the contexts it could
conceivably be used. S. Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An
Analysis and a Survey of its Vitality, 29 MERCER L. REV. 583
(1978).
t0. That is, there should be no difference in result between a case where the
manufacturer will be liable if he could foresee how the plaintiff would misuse the
product and one where the defendant could reasonably foresee how the injured
would "misbehave" by some form of contributory negligence.
11. The assumption of risk doctrine and the patent danger rule are first cousins.
In the former, the inquiry focuses on the state of mind of the injured and turns on
the voluntary, unreasonable exposure to the danger presented by the product.
As to the latter, the case-law supporting the patent danger rule (the so called
CONCLUSION
In instructing the jury in a strict liability design defect case,
the court should apply that instruction formulated by Dean
Wade:
A product is not duly safe (or is unreasonably dangerous) if
it is so likely to be harmful to persons (or property) that a
reasonable prudent. . .manufacturer (supplier), who had
actual knowledge of its harmful character would not place it
on the market. It is not necessary to find that this defendant
had knowledge of the harmful character of the product.. .in
order to determine that it was not duly safe (unreasonably
dangerous).2
In other words, did the manufacturer make a prudent
marketing decision?
In considering a defense that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, a court should first examine the nature of the defen-
dant's duty toward the plaintiff; this duty should be defined by
what the defendant could reasonably foresee as consequences
of the use of its product. In Cepeda, because the court imputed
knowledge of use without the guard to the manufacturer, the
defendant's duty logically extended to those who would use the
machine in this foreseeable state. See, Micallef v. Miehle Co.,
Etc., supra, at 380, 348 N.E.2d 573-574, 384 N.Y.S.2d 117,
where the court noted that the action of the injured plaintiff in
exposing himself to the danger presented by the machine was
within the "custom and usage" of the industry, and that the
defendant was aware of the practice which led to the plaintiff's
injury. A pure assumption of risk application might have
ignored particular circumstances of that case and barred
recovery as a matter of law.
In light of public policy considerations which have marked
some products liability analyses, assumption of risk should bar
recovery only in those situations not foreseen by the seller or
manufacturer of the product. Given that the seller's duty
should be coextensive with its foreseeability, possible risks to
the consumer, it should be encouraged to design a product
both to take those risks into account and to minimize them
where such precautions are necessary to ensure safety without
sacrifice of the product's social utility.
John Jeffrey Ross
Campo doctrine) states that the seller will not be liable where the danger
presented by its product is patent, obvious, to the injured. Actually, while the
patent danger rule is a sufficient, and not necessary, condition for assumption of
risk, the latter is necessary for an application of the Campo rule. It is assumed
that the encounter with an obvious danger entails unreasonable, voluntary risk
taking. At the very least, this is how the courts treat obvious dangers when they
utilize the patent danger rule to bar recovery. See Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y.
468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
Under a duty analysis, the patent danger rule could work against the defendant
manufacturer as well, because it would also be obvious to the defendant that his
product was dangerous. This extends foreseeability, and thus expands the manu
facturer's duty to protect the consumer from dangers obvious to all parties.
The patent danger rule is in the decline, because courts may see a duty to
protect the forgetful or hurried plaintiff in the employment situation. See,
Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 629 (1958) and
Micallef v. Miehe Co., Etc., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1976).
12. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825,
839 840 (1973). See also, Cepeda, supra, at 174, 386 A.2d at 827; Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 345 n.4, 363 A.2d 955, 959 n.4 (1976). See
generally, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443,
455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257 (1978) (California Supreme Court refused to retreat
from Cronin's rejection of "unreasonable danger" standard, but reacted to
criticism that earlier case law in that state had left the concept of defect without
any substantiation. As a result, that court articulates none other than the risk/
utility analysis, but refuses to allow any negligence description of its inquiry.).
